D. About Equality in the Divine Persons

11. On the fourth point [n.5] (setting aside for the present identity and likeness, which are not now in question [I d.31 q. un]), I say about equality that it exists perfectly in the divine persons.

12. And although equality in the case of some created beings can be taken according to quantity, whether continuous or discrete, and according to permanent and successive continuity, and although on this basis one could ask ‘whether there is in the divine persons equality in number’ (if perfect number were to exist there) and ‘whether there is perfect equality there in duration and according to eternity’ (which corresponds to successive quantity in creatures) - the first [sc. discrete quantity, or number], however, does not pertain to the present Distinction but to Distinction 24 (nor does the Master touch on anything about this here in the present Distinction, because he does not posit number here positively in the way perhaps it will be touched on in Distinction 24); but the Master does in a way touch on the second [sc. duration] (and he adduces Augustine [or rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter [n.4], and the thing was proved in Distinction 9 nn.6-11). The question is about the third [sc. continuous quantity], namely about equality in magnitude.

13. And that the equality is perfect is proved both from the remote foundation, namely magnitude, - and from the proximate idea of the foundation, namely unity [n.7].

The first proof is plain from the fact that magnitude of virtue is not perfect unless it is infinite; because infinity is not repugnant to it [sc. to magnitude of virtue], and nothing ‘which infinity is not repugnant to’ is perfect unless it is infinite; but every other magnitude of virtue is finite, and only it is infinite, as was made plain in I d.2 nn.131-136.

14. As to the second proof [n.13], the proposed conclusion is proved from the fact that in all other natural equalities the unity of the magnitude, in respect of which they are said to be equal, is diminished - because the magnitude in those equal things is separately counted; here however [sc. in the divine persons] there is perfect unity of magnitude and yet, along with it, a sufficient distinction between the related persons as is required for real relation.

15. But there is here a doubt because, since magnitude passes over into the essence, a relation founded on magnitude does not seem to be different from a relation founded on essence the way essence is a ‘what’, and so the equality does not seem to differ from the identity, - or if equality could be attended to in things that seem to be quasi-properties of the essence [sc. the attributes: power, wisdom, goodness     etc .], this is not attended to in them save insofar as they have magnitude of virtue; but this magnitude is not an attribute different from such perfection as asserts a mode intrinsic to the attribute (as was said often above [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221; d.10 n.30; d.13 nn.72, 80]); therefore      if likeness ‘in accord with such a property’ [sc. one or other attribute] is equality in the magnitude of the property, equality would not differ from likeness in the property - and thus it seems that equality insofar as it is equality should not here [sc. in the divine persons] be posited, because it exists neither as distinct from identity, speaking of the equality of essence, nor as distinct from likeness, speaking of the equality that is in magnitude of attributal perfections.

16. There is also another doubt because, if there can be infinite attributal perfections, infinite equalities of divine persons should be posited; for each perfection has its magnitude as a mode intrinsic to itself in accord with its own proper nature; therefore there will be as many magnitudes and equalities as there are attributal perfections.a

a [Interpolation] And further, since magnitude in divine reality is of itself of one idea, the consequence is that something of one idea in divine reality is not itself a this, and then the reason is not valid that was given above [Reportatio IA d.19 n.28] as to why there cannot be several supposits of the same idea in divine reality, namely that each of them is of itself a this and each production is of itself a this; but the opposite hereof seems to be true in the case of magnitude and equality in divine reality.

17. In response to these doubts.a To the first I reply - see the response etc. [I d.31 q. un. nn.6-7].

a [Interpolation] [I reply] that magnitude in divine reality does not state an attribute distinct from the others (as was said above about infinity [see reference in n.15 above]) but a degree that is intrinsic to any one of them, because there is no attribute in divine reality so simple that one may not ask about the quantity of its virtue; for if there were only one attribute in divine reality, as wisdom for example, it would still be possible to ask, as to its degree of virtue, how great it was; hence if each [sc. perfection simply, such as wisdom] existed without any other, each would still have a certain degree in its quantity of virtue, and each would be infinite and would have a magnitude formally infinite. And therefore magnitude is not in divine reality a single foundation merely of equality but is a single indifferent foundation, because it is preserved and included in every perfection simply, each of which perfections can be the foundation of equality, because each has its own magnitude; hence if in divine reality there are infinite ‘perfections simply’ there will also be infinite magnitudes, and likewise infinite equalities corresponding to them. But on the essence as it is a quiddity there is founded identity, - and as it asserts an infinite magnitude for the quantity of virtue, there is founded on it an equality between the persons that possess that essence. - But is equality distinguished in divine reality from likeness and identity? I reply that it both is so and is not so. For equality is not distinguished from likeness and identity as much as likeness and identity are distinguished from each other, because neither is its foundation (i.e. magnitude) distinguished from their foundations as much as their foundations are distinguished from each other, because magnitude - on which equality is founded - only asserts a mode or degree intrinsic to the foundations of identity and likeness, and is not distinguished from them formally as a ‘what’ or a ‘some sort of’ in the way they are distinguished form each other. Hence equality does not seem to assert in divine reality a different relation simply from likeness and identity, but it asserts only a perfect mode of each relation; a clarification can be given of the point: for if there are two white things one of which is whiter than the other, they are indeed alike although not equal - but they are not perfectly alike unless they be equal in whiteness, such that equality does not assert quasi-simply a relation other than their likeness, but asserts a perfection of likeness in each of the extremes and one that is in accord with a perfect mode of existence of the foundation in respect of which there is a likeness in each. So, if in the Father - according to the error of Arius - there were a greater deity and in the Son a lesser deity, the Son would indeed be like the Father; but he would not be equal with the Father because he would not have the form of deity as perfectly as the Father has it. Positing however - as we from the Faith posit - that nothing is less there in deity than anything else, the Son is perfectly alike, because they [sc. Father and Son] are altogether and perfectly equal in foundation of likeness. Hence, just as magnitude only states a perfect mode intrinsic to any essential perfection in divine reality, as with the essential perfections that are the foundations of identity and likeness, so equality states a perfect mode of these foundations and thus it does not state simply a relation different from them.

     To the second doubt [see the interpolation to n.16] one can reply in two ways. In one way as follows, that nothing of one idea can be multiplied unless it first require several things of another idea, through whose plurality the things of one idea are determined to their own plurality; but this does not hold of the divine persons, as is plain in the same place [Rep. IA d.19 n.29]; but in the proposed case equality requires a distinction of persons and of perfections simply, each of which has its own magnitude and all of them are distinct formally and in idea (the point is plain about justice and wisdom, which are of a different idea). One can say in another way, and equally well, that although unity goes along with the foundation of equality, yet it is not so remote a foundation of equality that by its diversity the equality is not multiplied, - which fact is plain in the relation of likeness: for just as knowledge is distinguished from charity, so is the likeness which is founded on unity in knowledge distinguished [sc. from the likeness which is founded on unity in charity]. But nevertheless one must say, as to the proposed case, that those equalities, founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections, are not of the same idea formally, but of different ideas; and therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of a different idea from magnitude in goodness and the unity different from the unity, so the equality is of a different idea in the one case and in the other - and then one does not have to concede that something of the same idea is multiplied in divine reality.